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ABSTRACT 
Although financial aid expenditures have grown considerably in recent decades, 
college dropout remains widespread. A natural question to ask is whether 
financial aid helps students progress to graduation. While many studies find that 
aid increases access and is worth the investment, much less is known about the 
effect on persistence, and in particular, the impact of aid on academic progress 
late into college. In this study, I examine the impact of need-based aid eligibility 
on late-stage college persistence by exploiting recent changes to federal Pell 
Grant eligibility rules that reduced the lifetime cap on aid from 18 to 12 
semesters. Using eleven years of annual data from the October Current 
Population Survey and a difference-in-differences research design that compares 
income-eligible Pell students impacted by the rule change to income-eligible 
students not affected by the lifetime eligibility reduction, I find that eliminating 
Pell Grant eligibility decreased persistence late into college by 14-15 percentage 
points, or approximately 4 points per $1,000 of grant aid. This effect was 
concentrated among students who had completed several years of credits and 
were previously enrolled full-time at four-year institutions. The evidence in this 
study is therefore consistent with financial constraints posing a persistent barrier 
to educational attainment along the entire pathway to college completion.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For decades financial aid has been a widely utilized policy tool to support access 
to higher education and postsecondary attainment. In the fifty years since the passage of 
the federal Higher Education Act of 1965, average aid per student has more than tripled 
in real dollars, from $3,709 (in 2014 dollars) to $14,180, largely due to the expansion of 
federal aid programs (Baum, Elliott, & Ma, 2014; Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). 
Despite this growth in spending, many students who attend college withdraw before 
earning a certificate or degree. Less than one-third of degree-seeking students who enter 
community colleges earn an associate’s or bachelor’s degree within six years of initial 
enrollment and nearly 40 percent of undergraduates first attending four-year institutions 
exit without a degree.
1
 Given the magnitude of dropouts, there is mounting concern that 
many students are leaving college without experiencing the full returns on their 
investment.  
The size of aid expenditures and troubling outcomes have motivated questions 
about whether financial aid is effectively helping students progress to graduation. While 
causal research largely finds that aid increases access (Dynarski, 2003; Seftor & Turner, 
2002; Turner, 2011), much less is known about the effect of aid on persistence, and in 
particular, its impact on late-stage progress to degree completion. By this I mean that 
little is known about whether aid that is disbursed beyond the second year of college 
supports progress to degree attainment. 
 In this paper, I shed light on the impact of losing eligibility for need-based aid on 
long-term college outcomes. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I exploit 
                                               
1
 Authors’ calculations using the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics 
2004/2009 Beginning Postsecondary Students Survey.  
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recent changes to federal Pell Grant eligibility rules that reduced the lifetime cap on aid 
from 18 to 12 semesters beginning in the 2012-13 academic year. Because it immediately 
eliminated a subset of continuing students from receiving $3,600 in average grant aid, the 
rule change provides a source of exogenous variation that I use to estimate the causal 
effect of Pell Grant eligibility on persistence beyond the sixth year of college. This work 
therefore fills a gap in the literature on whether sustained investment in need-based aid 
could raise educational attainment levels. It also informs an important design 
consideration of grant programs, the length of time for which aid should be offered, 
which deserves attention because the majority of graduates take longer than the 
customary four years to earn a bachelor’s degree.2 In fact, nearly forty percent of 
undergraduates receive Pell Grants and nearly forty percent of Pell recipients take longer 
than six years to graduate (Baum et al., 2014; Wei & Horn, 2009). The findings in this 
study are therefore relevant to a large share of the college student population in the 
United States. 
To preview my results, I find that losing Pell eligibility substantially increases the 
likelihood that income-eligible students leave college. I estimate that withdrawing Pell 
Grant offers to students enrolled for six or more years decreased persistence by 14.9 
percentage points, or 24.7 percent relative to a mean persistence rate of 60.3 percent. I 
also find that this effect was concentrated among students who attended four-year 
institutions full-time in the previous academic year. Although the counterfactual returns 
                                               
2
 The majority of students take five or six years to graduate for several reasons, including the fact that 
approximately 35 to 40 percent of them are required to take developmental education courses before they 
can progress towards degree requirements (Bettinger, Boatman, & Long, 2013). The majority of students 
also work while attending school, hindering full-time enrollment and slowing progress to completion 
(Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 2012; Scott-Clayton, 2012). Discontinuous enrollment is also widespread. 
Using administrative data from Florida and Ohio, I calculate that nearly one-third of students take time off 
for at least one semester before returning to pursue their degree. 
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to completion for students induced to dropout are not certain, prior research finds that 
finishing degrees produces an earnings boost for a variety of students and mitigates the 
risk of negative outcomes, including defaulting on student loans (Kane & Rouse, 1995; 
Looney & Yannelis, 2015; Zeidenberg, Scott, & Belfield, 2015; Zimmerman, 2014). The 
evidence in this study is therefore consistent with financial constraints posing a persistent 
barrier to educational attainment along the entire pathway to completion.  
I structure the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section II, I discuss the 
theoretical motivation for this study, review existing evidence on the effects of financial 
aid on persistence and completion, and provide background information on the change to 
Pell Grant eligibility. I describe the data, analytic samples and research design in section 
III and present my empirical results in section IV. I conclude in section V with a policy 
discussion of the findings and directions for future research. 
 
II. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION, PRIOR EVIDENCE & POLICY CONTEXT 
Competing hypotheses posit that financial aid may help or have little impact on 
progress to degree completion. On the one hand, grant aid may persuade students on the 
margin of graduating to persist by reducing out-of-pocket expenses. For example, a 
multi-stage model of human capital investment predicts that students will choose to enroll 
in an additional year of college if the expected lifetime benefit of attending an extra year 
exceeds the expected lifetime benefit of dropping out (Bettinger, 2004). Because this 
model assumes that students update their expectations with experience, the decision to 
persist in college may be influenced by changes to the availability of tuition assistance. 
For students on the margin of completing college, losing aid may alter the cost-benefit 
evaluation enough to induce departure.  
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In addition to changing the investment value of attendance, students may become 
acclimatized to receiving aid, making it difficult to forecast and contingency plan for 
abrupt changes in funding. Older students may also face stiffer credit constraints than 
younger college-goers, and it may not be easy or possible for them to offset grant aid 
with additional student loans. All of these scenarios predict that losing eligibility for 
need-based aid will decrease the probability of early and late-stage persistence.  
Yet for competing reasons, financial aid may have a diminishing effect as 
students near the finish line. For instance, students may become less likely to update their 
schooling decisions over time as their investments in college accumulate and the 
remaining cost to attainment declines. Decisions to persist may stabilize over time for this 
reason and attenuate the impact of aid on persistence as experience accrues. Losing aid 
may also have different short- and long-run effects depending on how much time students 
have to adjust. For example, if less aid comes as a surprise at first but is eventually 
predictable, the effect on persistence may be short-lived. Because grant aid offsets the 
full cost of attendance to students, it is also possible that offering aid late into college 
may delay graduation for some students.
3
 Financial aid may therefore encourage 
extended “dabbling” that prolongs time to completion, while eliminating aid eligibility 
late into college may increase the efficiency of degree production.  
Empirically, whether sustained investment in need-based aid facilitates progress 
to completion or not remains an open question. Although a growing body of evidence 
indicates that more generous need-based aid can increase enrollment, persistence, and 
                                               
3
 In addition, the preference to delay completion may intensify in weak economic cycles when labor market 
opportunities for recent graduates are less certain. The aftermath of the Great Recession, which coincided 
with the elimination of late-stage Pell Grant aid eligibility, is one such period when financial aid might be 
expected to induce some students to forego graduation until more promising job opportunities arise. 
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degree completion at four-year colleges (Angrist et al., 2014; Bettinger, 2004; Castleman 
& Long, forthcoming; Goldrick-Rab et al., 2012), it remains unclear whether losing grant 
eligibility has a symmetrical effect on attainment. By focusing on the cumulative effects 
of aid over time, prior studies have also largely ignored whether enrollment duration 
moderates the impact on persistence and completion. In fact, I am aware of only one 
study that has addressed the time dimensionality of financial aid effectiveness. 
DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall (2002) find evidence that frontloading grants and 
scholarships would lead to modest increases in persistence at four-year college; however, 
the robustness of this finding is unclear since it is based on simulated policy changes. It is 
also unclear whether the result generalizes to the broad population of low-income 
students attending college today, given the authors’ reliance on a dated sample of 
students enrolled at a single institution.     
Extending the Literature to Late-Stage Persistence  
In this study, I examine how losing eligibility for the federal Pell Grant affects the 
probability that advanced undergraduates persist in college. My findings extend the 
literature in two ways. First, I estimate average treatment effects which are more policy-
relevant than the local average treatment effects reported in most available studies that 
rely on quasi-experimental methods (Castleman & Long, forthcoming; Goldrick-Rab et 
al., 2012; Marx & Turner, 2015). Second, I estimate effects for students who have made 
considerable progress towards a degree. As my review of the literature reveals, no studies 
have isolated the effect of aid on persistence as it is disbursed late into college. To the 
extent that aid increases completion, the effect may be driven by early subsidies that set 
students on a path to completion which they would follow in the absence of continued 
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support. Alternatively, financial constraints may pose a formidable barrier to attainment 
along the entire pathway to completion. My findings tease out whether the effect of aid 
on persistence varies with time spent in college.  
To investigate the research question, I exploit recent changes to Pell Grant 
eligibility rules that took effect in the 2012-13 academic year. In 2011, the Pell Grant 
program faced an $18 billion shortfall as a result of growing enrollments in college and 
recent program changes that made more students eligible for aid.
4
 After infusing the 
program with $17 billion, Congress addressed the remaining funding gap by 
implementing four eligibility changes which applied to both incoming and continuing 
students:  
1) Eliminating eligibility for students without a high school diploma or GED; 
2) Eliminating eligibility for students who qualified for the smallest grant amount, 
equivalent to 10 percent of the maximum award, or $555; 
3) Reducing the family income ceiling that automatically qualified students for the 
maximum award from $32,000 to $23,000; and 
4) Reducing the lifetime duration of eligibility from 18 to 12 semesters.
5
 
I examine the impact on persistence caused in particular by the change to the lifetime 
eligibility cap. Available estimates suggest that 60,000 – 100,000 undergraduates were 
affected by this rule change alone (Associate of Community College Trustees, 2011; 
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 The number of students receiving a Pell Grant increased by 13 and 27 percent in 2008-09 and 2009-10, 
respectively, whereas the year-over-year increase never exceeded 5 percent between 2004-05 and 2007-08 
(Mahan, 2011). While part of this increase is attributable to lower opportunity costs of attendance during 
the Great Recession, Congress also relaxed income eligibility restrictions to qualify for Pell Grant aid and 
increased the maximum grant amount during this time, both of which contributed to skyrocketing program 
costs. Congressional Budget Office estimates suggest that approximately 10 percent of recipients in 2010-
11 became eligible for aid because of these prior eligibility rule changes (Alsalam, 2013). 
5
 Full-time equivalency provisions allowed part-time students to remain aid-eligible over a longer time 
horizon. 
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Institute for College Access and Success, 2011). There is also evidence that the rule 
disproportionately impacted students attending four-year institutions. For example, the 
California State University System predicted that 6,100 students, or 4 percent of its total 
undergraduate population, lost Pell eligibility as a result of the lifetime eligibility 
reduction (Nelson, 2012).
6
  
The change to lifetime Pell eligibility coincided with another noteworthy program 
revision. In 2012-13, Pell-eligible students also lost access to year-round grants that 
allowed students completing a full credit load during the regular school year to receive a 
second award for summer attendance. In the 2010-11 school year, 1.2 million students 
(13 percent of award recipients)  received supplemental awards that increased the average 
Pell Grant per recipient by approximately $200, or 6 percent (Baum et al., 2014; Delisle 
& Miller, 2015). Unfortunately, in my empirical analysis I am unable to isolate the effect 
on persistence of reducing the lifetime cap from the effect of eliminating year-long 
awards.
7
 My results can therefore be interpreted as the combined effect of losing aid 
because of both program changes.  
However, there are several reasons why the effects on persistence I find are likely 
driven by the reduction in lifetime eligibility. First, unlike the lifetime rule change, 
eliminating the year-round Pell did not affect aid eligibility during the traditional 
academic year. One might expect that losing year-round aid would affect time to degree 
                                               
6
 Additional evidence that the rule disproportionately affected students attending four-year institutions is 
evident from the patterns of persistence across college sectors. While nearly 40 percent of Pell Grant 
recipients take more than six years to earn a bachelor’s degree (Wei & Horn, 2009), only 10 percent of Pell 
recipients who began at a community college remain enrolled in the two-year sector after five years (Cho, 
Jacobs, & Zhang, 2013). The overwhelming majority of Pell recipients still enrolled in college after five 
years are therefore working towards bachelor’s degrees at four-year institutions. 
7
 Importantly, the simultaneous eligibility changes do not call into question the internal validity of my 
results, but rather the policy implications of my findings in regard to how need-based aid programs might 
be designed to support late-stage progress to degree completion. 
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completion for this reason, but not cause students late into their college careers to dropout 
altogether. Second, my research design is based on comparing the enrollment behavior of 
two groups of income-eligible students before and after the more stringent lifetime cap 
took effect, and both groups of students lost eligibility for supplemental Pell awards in 
the post-2012 period, while only one of these groups lost eligibility as a result of the 
lifetime rule change. Third, several reports indicate that the availability of year-long 
awards increased summer enrollment at two-, but not four-year institutions (Bannister & 
Kramer, 2015; Katsinas, Hagedorn, Mensel, & Friedel, 2011; U.S. Department of 
Education, 2011), whereas my results are based on a sample of individuals who enrolled 
at four-year institutions in the prior year and are driven by changes in their decisions to 
persist at four-year institutions. 
 
III. DATA, SAMPLES, & RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data 
For my empirical analysis, I rely on eleven years of data from the 2004-2014 
October Current Population Surveys (CPS). The CPS is a monthly, nationally-
representative household survey collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Each October, respondents are asked about the schooling behavior of all 
household members, and so I have information on whether all household members were 
enrolled in college, and if so, the type of institution they attended, their year in college, 
how many years of credits they have completed, and their enrollment intensity.  
While the CPS is the best publicly available dataset for this study because of its 
national scope, detailed enrollment information, and synchronicity with the policy 
change, it does have some limitations. Specifically, I do not observe if individuals are 
11 
 
 
 
eligible for the Pell Grant directly in the data. Following Seftor and Turner (2002), I use 
information on family income and household size to estimate the Expected Family 
Contribution (EFC) of individuals according to annual aid formulas published by the U.S. 
Department of Education (DOE). I use this EFC estimate, coupled with the average cost 
of in-state tuition at public institutions published in the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS) and DOE Pell award schedules, to identify individuals 
who are likely income-eligible (i.e. Pell-EFC-eligible) for the Pell Grant in each 
academic year. Misclassification errors predominantly arise from the fact that asset 
information is not reported in the CPS. I therefore assume that all respondents have zero 
assets, which tends to overstate eligibility and will bias my results towards zero. The 
magnitude of this bias, however, is likely very small since most assets that families own 
(e.g. homes and retirement funds) are omitted from the aid eligibility formula and 
applicable assets count against eligibility only if they exceed a threshold.
8
 In simulation 
work, Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2007) find that the correlation of actual versus 
predicted Pell Grant amounts that excluded asset data was 0.95, and three quarters of 
applicants would have received exactly the same award amounts if assets were excluded 
from the award calculation.  
The CPS is also limited because year of attendance is top coded in the data, so 
that individuals in their fourth year of college or beyond are collapsed into one group. I 
improve upon this limitation by matching individuals across years since half of the CPS 
sample in each year is surveyed again the following October.
9
 This allows me to identify 
                                               
8
 This threshold was $71,000 for independent students in the 2012-13 school year. 
9
 This matching strategy would be compromised if factors correlated with college attainment, such as the 
condition of the economy, impacted the likelihood of mobility (and therefore match rates) over time. This 
does not appear to be a major threat to my results. The average number of matches per year in my main 
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all non-degree earners who would have needed to enroll in college for at least 5 years to 
earn a degree, and I treat this group as my proxy for students who exhausted their Pell 
eligibility as a result of the new lifetime limit.
10
 In the remainder of the paper, I refer to 
this subset of individuals as the 5+ or treated group, and to those who completed fewer 
years of college as the 2-4 or control group. Since the 5+ group includes persons who 
enrolled in college and maintained their eligibility for aid after the lifetime rule change 
took effect, and also due to the measurement error in determining Pell-EFC-eligibility, 
my results likely provide lower bound estimates of the effect of losing grant eligibility on 
college persistence. 
Samples 
To examine the effects of aid on persistence, I condition the analytic sample on 
individuals who enrolled in college in the previous academic year. Because the lifetime 
rule change primarily eliminated eligibility for students at four-year institutions, I also 
restrict the sample to include only students enrolled at four-year colleges in the previous 
year. I further exclude individuals who earned a bachelor’s degree between year t-1 and 
year t in order to isolate the effect on late-stage persistence. Lastly, I exclude 86 
individuals whose highest level of education completed was less than a high school 
diploma and 102 individuals who would have qualified to receive a minimum Pell Grant 
award since those students lost aid eligibility as a result of the other rule changes 
                                                                                                                                            
sample is 1,109 and 1,042 before versus after the rule change, respectively. Among Pell-EFC-eligible 
individuals, the average number of matches per year in these two periods is 452 and 492, respectively. 
10
 Through this approach, I rely on each individual’s reported year in college in year t-1 to determine their 
expected year in college in year t. This strategy is defensible, given that very few matched individuals 
reported a year in college across surveys indicative of backtracking or leapfrogging. Ninety percent of all 
non-degree earners who enrolled at four-year institutions in subsequent years reported their class level in 
year t as being the same or one year higher than in the previous year. 
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Congress implemented in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012.
11
 After applying 
these restrictions, my sample consists of 4,540 non-degree earners who were Pell-EFC-
eligible in school years 2005-06 through 2014-15.  
 In column 3 of Table 1, I report descriptive statistics for the Pell-EFC-eligible 
sample. For purposes of comparison, I also present attributes of four-year college 
undergraduates nationally in columns 1 and 2 using data from the 2012 National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study and the characteristics of non-EFC-eligible individuals 
from the CPS in column 4. Approximately 59 percent of Pell-EFC-eligible individuals 
are female, which closely mirrors the profile of Pell Grant recipients nationally. 
Comparing the attributes of EFC- and non-EFC-eligible individuals within the CPS also 
indicates that the Pell eligibility indicator I created clearly distinguishes more- from less-
advantaged students. The fraction minority is larger in the Pell-EFC-eligible group (40 
percent versus 24 percent) and the mean income gap is nearly $68,000. However, on 
some dimensions the EFC-eligible students in the CPS sample appear slightly more 
advantaged than the overall population of Pell recipients. A smaller fraction of the Pell-
EFC-eligible sample is minority (40 percent) relative to the census of Pell recipients (48.3 
percent). Mean family income in the Pell-EFC-eligible sample is also $4,700 higher than 
the national average for Pell Grant recipients. To the extent that these differences reflect 
that the income-eligible students in the CPS sample are better equipped to absorb 
                                               
11
  I keep individuals in the main sample whose award amounts were affected by the family income 
reduction that automatically qualified students for maximum awards, as nearly all of those students 
remained eligible for aid. A similar revision to the income ceiling in 2009-10, which increased the 
threshold from $20,000 to $30,000, suggests that the 2012-13 change reduced the average award per 
recipient by less than $250 (Alsalam, 2013). As a robustness check, I re-fit my statistical models after 
excluding these individuals and find that the change in auto-zero eligibility does not explain the overall 
findings.  
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financial aid losses than the typical Pell recipient, my results may further understate the 
average effect of losing aid eligibility on late-stage persistence.  
Because my empirical strategy rests on making within-group comparisons 
between treated and control students before and after the lifetime eligibility cap was 
lowered, it is important that the relative composition of my sample remained stable over 
time. I examine evidence for this in Table 2. Columns 1 – 4 report group-specific means 
by years relative to the enactment of the lifetime rule change. In column 5, I present 
estimates of compositional changes to the sample over time. The coefficients on age 
indicate that the 5+ group of Pell-EFC-eligible students was slightly younger on average 
in the years preceding the rule change.  None of the other estimates in column 5 are large 
or statistically significant, and given the small subset of 5+ students in the sample, it is 
possible that the age difference merely reflects sampling variability. Yet to the extent that 
it is not, a secular rise in age over time could upwardly bias my estimates since older 
students are less likely to persist in college on average.
12
 As I discuss in more detail 
below, I account for this source of potential bias in my statistical models by controlling 
for the main effect of age and including interaction terms that allow the effect of age on 
schooling behavior to vary by class level and over time.  
In addition to my main sample, I make use of two additional samples to explore 
the robustness of my findings.
13
 The first incorporates the 5,395 income-ineligible 
individuals into the analytic sample to examine if my results are biased by secular 
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 In actuality, evidence suggests that older students were proportionately more likely to enroll in college in 
response to the Great Recession (Barr & Turner, 2013; Long, 2015). We might have therefore expected the 
share of older students to decline over time as the economy recovered. This provides additional evidence 
that the age difference among treated students may be an artifact of sampling error. 
13
 I report summary statistics for the additional samples in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
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enrollment changes between more and less advanced students.
14
 The second includes 
students who earned a bachelor’s degree between year t-1 and year t. Since my main 
sample is conditioned on non-degree earners, it is possible that I falsely attribute spikes in 
degree receipt leading up to the eligibility change to declines in persistence after the rule 
change took effect. Including degree earners in the sample allows me to investigate 
whether the probability of graduation increased in response to the impending loss of grant 
aid.
15
  
Empirical Strategy 
In my empirical analysis, I exploit the fact that the lifetime eligibility change 
impacted only Pell-EFC-eligible students with long enrollment histories beginning in the 
2012-13 academic year. I therefore use a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy to 
estimate the average treatment effect of Pell Grant eligibility on late-stage persistence, 
where the first difference is whether or not a student would have enrolled in their fifth or 
higher year in college and the second difference is before versus after the lifetime rule 
change took effect. Under the assumption that the de-trended enrollment patterns for 
students in both groups would be the same in the absence of the eligibility change, I 
capture intent-to-treat effects of Pell aid eligibility on persistence by fitting the following 
statistical model: 
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 5𝑖
+ + 𝛾 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 + 𝛿 5𝑖
+ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑠2
𝑠=1  + 
𝜔𝑠  ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑠 ∗ 5𝑖
+2
𝑠=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  
                                               
14
 To partly account for error in estimating Pell-EFC-eligibility, I only include income-eligible individuals 
in the augmented sample who were ineligible in both survey years.  
15
 I exclude 2-4 individuals from this sample because few students in the control group earned bachelor’s 
degrees, and as a result, they do not provide a realistic counterfactual to compare against 5+ students. I 
instead use 5+ income-ineligible students as the control group in the analysis of degree attainment. The 
graduation sample therefore consists of 2,182 5+ students, of which 985 are Pell-EFC-eligible and 1,197 
are non-EFC-eligible. 
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where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a measure of persistence for individual 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 is an indicator 
equal to one if the observation occurred before July 1, 2012 (i.e. individuals surveyed in 
October 2008 – 2011) and is zero otherwise, 5𝑖
+ is the treatment proxy that equals one if 
the individual completed five or more years of college and is zero otherwise, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a 
continuous time trend which I model separately for 5+ and 2-4 individuals and allow to 
vary nonlinearly, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a mean-zero random error term.
16
 𝛿 captures the intent-to-
treat effect estimate of interest in this model. In all estimates, I report standard errors that 
account for the potential clustering of schooling behavior within households.
17
  
To increase the precision of my estimates and examine their sensitivity to the 
inclusion of covariates, I successively introduce controls that build towards the following 
“full control” model: 
(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽 5𝑖
+ + 𝛾 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 + 𝛿 5𝑖
+ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑠2
𝑠=1 + 
𝜔𝑠  ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑠 ∗ 5𝑖
+2
𝑠=1 + 𝜋 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃 𝑋𝑖 ∗ 5𝑖
+ + 𝛼𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 + 𝜏 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑟𝑡 +
𝜓 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑟𝑡 ∗ 5𝑖
+ + 𝜂𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑠𝑡 ∗ 5𝑖
+ + 𝜅𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡. 
All common terms in equation (2) are defined as in equation (1). In this model, I also 
include a vector of individual-level covariates (𝑋𝑖) comprised of indicators for sex, race, 
marital status, and whether or not the person resided in an urban area. This vector also 
includes continuous measures of age in years and household size. To allow for a different 
effect of these controls for treated and control students and to allow those effects to vary 
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 In Table A3, I present estimates from regressions that replace the linear and quadratic year terms with 
year and year-by-5
+
 fixed effects. The results are substantively similar using this nonparametric 
specification, indicating that the linear and quadratic year terms closely approximate the functional form of 
the underlying time trend. However, because the parsimony from specifying a functional form buys more 
statistical precision, I present estimates from regressions that model time parametrically throughout my 
main results. 
17
 The 4,540 individuals in my main sample reside in 3,999 unique households. The large number of 
clusters suggests that my estimates likely do not suffer from overstated precision, which I examine in more 
detail by calculating an alternative p-value after conducting a permutation test. 
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across time, I include their interactions with the treated indicator and with the pre-2012 
indicator. I also include census division fixed effects (𝜅𝑟) that absorb all time-invariant 
regional differences in college attainment. In addition, because the lifetime rule change 
occurred amidst the recovery from the Great Recession, I also control for time-varying 
state and regional labor market conditions by including a labor market index that is an 
equally weighted composite of the state seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, state 
annual employment-to-population ratio, and regional job seekers-to-job openings ratio 
(𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑟𝑡), as well as a measure of annual state appropriations per student (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑠𝑡). 
Controlling for these factors mitigates spurious attribution of enrollment changes to the 
policy which could have been operating through distortions to the opportunity cost of 
college and institutional resource constraints over this time period. By including 
interactions of the labor market index and state appropriations controls with the treatment 
indicator, I also allow the effect of the economy to differ for treated and control students.  
 As a robustness check, I also fit a triple difference model (DDD) that uses the 
enrollment differences between 5+ and 2-4 individuals within the income-ineligible 
group as an additional control. This model, though underpowered, allows me to examine 
if the covariates in equation (2) do not fully capture secular changes that may have 
differentially affected the probability of re-enrollment between 5+ and 2-4 students over 
time. This specification takes the following form: 
(3) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 5𝑖
+ + 𝛽25
+ ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾1 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 
𝛿1 5𝑖
+ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 + 𝛿25𝑖
+ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒2012𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝜑𝑠1 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑠2
𝑠=1 +
𝜑𝑠2 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙2𝑠=1 + 𝜔𝑠1  ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑠 ∗ 5𝑖
+2
𝑠=1 + 𝜔𝑠2  ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑠 ∗ 5𝑖
+ ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙2𝑠=1 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
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where all common terms are again defined as above and 𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖 is equal to one for 
individuals who are Pell-EFC-eligible and is zero otherwise. In equation (3), 𝛿2 now 
represents the coefficient of interest: it estimates the difference in the difference-in-
differences estimate between Pell-EFC-eligible and non-Pell-EFC-eligible students. I also 
augment equation (3) with the full set of controls in equation (2), and I additionally allow 
the effect of all covariates to vary by EFC eligibility status in this model.  
 
IV. RESULTS 
Preliminary Graphical Evidence 
 Comparing the re-enrollment trends of treated to control students suggests the 
lifetime rule change decreased persistence for students late into their college careers. In 
Panel A of Figure 1, I plot the fraction of Pell-EFC-eligible students that returned to 
college by class level and year. Among the control group, the persistence rate was 
relatively flat at around 0.76 from 2005 to 2014. By comparison, the trend for the treated 
group over this time horizon declined from 0.73 to 0.63 between 2005 and 2008 before 
rising in each of the next three years. In 2012, when the new lifetime cap first took effect, 
the persistence rate declined by almost 20 percentage points and remained near 0.60 
thereafter. Variability in the persistence rate among 5+ students pre-2012 likely captures 
a combination of factors, including sampling error, the effect of the financial crisis, and 
prior eligibility changes to the Pell Grant program.
18
  
In Panel B of Figure 1, I show the persistence trends of non-EFC-eligible students 
for additional comparison. The re-enrollment rates among this group held relatively 
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 See footnote 4 for a description of the previous program changes. Importantly, those changes endured 
after the lifetime cap reduction took effect. Therefore, while they may have contributed to the rise in 
persistence before 2012, it is unlikely that previous eligibility changes explain the precipitous post-
treatment decline among treated students.  
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stable at around 0.80 and 0.65 for 2-4 and 5+ students, respectively, over the entire 
period. In contrast to the treatment group, 5+ students in the non-EFC-eligible group 
returned to college at almost the exact same rate immediately before and after the new 
lifetime rule took effect. Taken together, the divergent re-enrollment trends by treatment 
status suggest that losing grant eligibility decreased the probability of persistence among 
students who had invested considerably in their college education.  
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effects on Persistence 
I now investigate how much of the raw decline in persistence can be attributed to 
the policy change by fitting statistical models to the data. In Table 3, I present a series of 
estimates that control in various combinations for secular time trends, fixed student 
attributes and regional differences, and the strength of the labor market over time. 
Column 1 estimates equation (1) and includes only group-specific quadratic time trends 
as controls. Consistent with the descriptive graphical evidence, the coefficient on Before 
indicates no change in the probability of persistence for 2-4 students relative to when the 
lifetime rule change took effect. The coefficient on the interaction term in row 1 is the 
causal estimate of interest and implies that in the years preceding the rule change, 
eligibility for Pell Grant aid increased the probability of persistence late into college by 
23 percentage points.  
Of course, these estimates likely overestimate the true causal effect since equation 
(1) only accounts for time trends. Moving from left to right in Table 3, I therefore 
examine the sensitivity of the estimate to the inclusion of different controls. In column 2, 
I control for the gender, race, age, marital status, household size and residential 
urbanicity of individuals. I also include the interactions of these with the 5+ indicator and 
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the pre-2012 indicator. This allows me to investigate if, as the results in Table 2 call into 
question, the effect on persistence is operating through a secular rise in the representation 
of older students within the 5+ group over time. The estimate in column 2 decreases 
slightly to 0.187 but remains substantively large and statistically significant. Likewise, 
when I control for the labor market index and state appropriations per student in column 
3, the estimated effect on persistence is 0.211, nearly unchanged from the base model in 
column 1. In column 4, I estimate the full model as specified in equation (2). Jointly 
controlling for student demographics, regional effects, and the economic controls reduces 
the effect on persistence to 14.9 percentage points, but this estimate remains marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level. Off of a baseline persistence rate of 60.3 percent in the 
post-2012 period, this estimate implies that losing eligibility for Pell aid decreased 
persistence among 5+ students by 24.7 percent. 
The typical enrollment patterns of students late into college suggest that the 
overall effect on persistence should be driven by students withdrawing from four-year 
institutions and not transferring from four- to two-year colleges when Pell aid is lost. I 
examine whether this is the case in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 by estimating effects 
separately by enrollment type.
19
 Consistent with expectation, losing eligibility for Pell aid 
decreased the probability of persistence to a four-year institution by 14 percentage points 
(24.9 percent) and had no effect on two-year transfers. The results in columns 4-7 also 
indicate that all of the persistence decline post-2012 operated through students previously 
enrolled full-time at public colleges, perhaps because private four-year institutions are 
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 I also examined, but find no evidence of differential effects by race, gender, or dependency status. 
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more likely than public colleges to adjust student aid packages in response to the 
availability of federal tuition subsidies (Epple, Romano, Sarpça, & Sieg, 2013).  
The fact that losing aid eligibility decreased the probability of persistence does 
not indicate whether the effect was short-lived or sustained over time. Indeed, it is 
possible that the eligibility change surprised institutions and families in the first year, but 
then had minimal impact in subsequent years when more lead time allowed for other 
sources of tuition assistance to offset the loss of grant aid. In Table 5, I examine the 
dynamic effects of the rule change in the first three years after the reduced lifetime cap 
took effect. The results provide little evidence that the effect diminished between 2012-
13 and 2014-15. In column 1, the point estimates on persistence to any college in the first 
and third year post-rule change are -16.1 and -13.5 points, respectively. Although the 
magnitude of the estimate in year 2 is considerably smaller, I fail to reject that the effect 
is constant in each of the first three years following the rule change (p-value on F-test = 
0.293). In column 2, I also show that the dynamic effect on persistence at four-year 
institutions, which ranges from a 12.6 percentage point decline in year 2 to a 15.2 point 
decline in year 3, is stable in the first three years after the new lifetime cap took effect.  
Robustness Checks 
I conduct several robustness analyses to validate that the loss of aid eligibility 
induced students late into college to dropout. First, I examine whether I overstate the 
precision of the estimated effect by conducting a permutation test. Following Garthwaite 
et al. (2014), I assign placebo treatments to each class level-by-year combination in the 
EFC-eligible and non-EFC-eligible samples. I then re-estimate equation (2) to obtain a 
distribution of placebo difference-in-differences estimates which I compare to the actual 
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estimate in column 4 of Table 3. I present the results from this exercise in Figure 2, 
which shows that the actual estimate of 14.9 percentage points is larger in absolute 
magnitude than 94.4 percent of all placebo estimates. Furthermore, in Table A3 I report 
year-over-year difference-in-differences estimates for the actual treated group and show 
that the only significant effect is isolated to the year when the lifetime eligibility revision 
was introduced. Taken together, these results provide evidence that the actual estimate is 
capturing the effect of the eligibility policy shock and not random jumps in the 
persistence rate due to sampling variability from small class level-by-year cells. 
As a second robustness check, I examine the stability of the persistence effect to 
alternative sample constructions in Table 6. In the first row, I reproduce the estimate from 
column 4 of Table 3. In the next five rows, I impose additional restrictions to the main 
sample. First, to examine if the effect on persistence is driven by the change to the 
income restriction which automatically qualifies students for maximum Pell awards, I 
exclude students with family incomes between $23,000 and $30,000 who were directly 
affected by that eligibility change. In the third row, I limit the sample to only the 2010 – 
2014 school years to investigate if the main estimate is an artifact of previous program 
changes that were phased in from 2008 to 2009. The magnitude of the effect in both 
samples is approximately 16 percentage points and therefore robust to these exclusions. 
In the fourth row, I exclude states with the five largest public university systems to 
examine whether the effect on persistence is driven by changes to state-specific policies 
that coincided with the lifetime Pell eligibility revision. The magnitude of the estimate 
from this restriction is twice as large, indicating that the impact of losing Pell eligibility is 
not isolated to students from a particular geographic context.  
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In the last two rows of Table 6, I investigate if my results are sensitive to age 
restrictions. I first limit the sample to only 18-35 year olds, since approximately 12 
percent of individuals in the main sample are younger or older students whose enrollment 
decisions may not be representative of college-goers more generally. The estimate 
(0.119), though imprecise, remains stable and thus implies that erratic attendance patterns 
among age-atypical students does not account for the decline in persistence of 5+ 
students post-2012. As a falsification test, I also re-estimate the difference-in-difference 
model after conditioning the sample on 17-24 year olds, since it is very unlikely that 5+ 
students in this age range would have enrolled in college long enough to exhaust their 
eligibility. As expected, the point estimate (.006) in this specification is near zero.  
As a third robustness check, I estimate a triple difference (DDD) model using the 
enrollment patterns of non-EFC-eligible students as an additional control  to examine if 
the main estimate is biased by secular changes not fully captured by the full set of 
covariates in equation (2). The results of this analysis are based on equation (3) and 
presented in Table 7. In column 1, I again reproduce the DD estimates for Pell-EFC-
eligible individuals from column 4 of Table 3. Analogous results for non-EFC-eligible 
students are presented in column 2, which show no evidence that the change in lifetime 
eligibility affected the re-enrollment rates of aid-ineligible 5+ students. The point 
estimate (-.008) is near zero and opposite-signed. In column 3, I pool the Pell-EFC-
eligible and non-EFC-eligible groups to fit the DDD specification. The coefficient on the 
triple interaction in row 1 is the causal estimate of interest, which, although estimated 
imprecisely, is larger than the DD estimate (0.161 versus 0.149).  
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I conduct a fourth robustness check to investigate whether the effect on 
persistence is confounded by conditioning the sample on non-degree earners. If students 
were aware of the lifetime aid limit leading up to the rule change, then it is possible that 
the impending loss of aid incentivized some students to graduate to avoid paying 
additional out-of-pocket costs to continue their studies. If this were the case, I could 
falsely attribute an attainment effect in the run-up to the rule change to a dropout effect 
after the new rule was implemented.  
I examine the effect on bachelor’s degree completion in column 1 of Table 8. In 
this analysis, I include students who graduated in year t-1 in the sample and investigate 
the probability of completion among only 5+ students. I again use a difference-in-
difference design to estimate degree effects, where the first difference is before versus 
after the rule change and the second difference is now the difference in completion rates 
between Pell-EFC-eligible and non-EFC-eligible students. For this analysis, I also assign 
2011-12 to the post-treatment period, for if students were incentivized to graduate more 
quickly, their motivation to do so would have emerged in the year before the change to 
aid eligibility. The results in Table 8 do not provide evidence that the effect on 
persistence can be attributed to bachelor’s degree attainment. Although the estimate on 
degree attainment is imprecise and I cannot rule out the possibility of a large effect, the 
coefficient (-0.002) implies that losing aid had no effect on time to completion.  
In addition to degree completion, I also investigate how much academic progress 
students made in college before they were induced to dropout. On the one hand, it is 
reasonable to expect that students who enrolled in college for several years would have 
completed a large share of their academic requirements. However, the relationship 
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between time enrolled and academic progress is not clear-cut. For instance, the 
correlation between years in college and years of credits completed in my sample is just 
0.68, and 58 percent of 5+ EFC-eligible students accumulated fewer than four years of 
college credits. It is therefore possible that the new lifetime rule simply prompted 
students with minimal credit attainment to withdraw. To the extent that this opened up 
enrollment opportunities for new students or increased the resources available to 
continuing students, the negative effect on persistence might be interpreted in a positive 
light.  
In Figure 3, I examine the distribution of cumulative credits completed before and 
after the lifetime rule change for 5+ and 2-4 EFC-eligible students. Because the CPS 
captures credits completed as an ordinal measure (in years), I plot the fitted credit 
distributions for 2-4 and 5+ EFC-eligible students after estimating an ordered probit 
regression that includes the full controls listed in equation (2). The distributions are 
identical in the pre- and post-2012 periods for 2-4 individuals, while among the treated 
group there is a clear leftward shift in the credit distribution in the post-2012 period. In 
columns 3-7 of Table 8, I present marginal effect estimates of the change in the 
distribution of credits completed among treated students. The point estimate in column 6 
indicates that the share of 5+ individuals completing four or more years of credits 
decreased by 17.7 percentage points (42.4 percent) after the lifetime cap was lowered. 
The estimates in columns 2-5 also indicate that the relative composition of treated 
students who completed fewer than four years of credits increased systematically after the 
rule change. The evidence in Figure 3 and Table 8 therefore indicate that the students 
induced to withdraw because of the rule change had completed a substantial share of the 
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credits typically required for a bachelor’s degree.20 Collectively, the results of the 
robustness checks I conduct reinforce that the loss of grant eligibility decreased late-stage 
persistence. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The college dropout phenomenon is pervasive, and little to date is known about 
how late-stage financial aid affects persistence and whether the effect of aid on 
persistence varies along the pathway to completion. Using a difference-in-differences 
research design, I exploit a recent eligibility change to the lifetime availability of federal 
Pell Grants to examine the effects of need-based aid eligibility on late-stage persistence.  
My findings reveal that sustained investments in need-based grants are a 
necessary condition for maintaining academic progress for many low-income students. I 
find that losing aid eligibility after six years decreased persistence by 14-15 percentage 
points, or 25 percent, and that the entire effect was concentrated among students who had 
completed several years of credits and were previously enrolled full-time at four-year 
institutions. Based on the average Pell Grant award of $3,676 (in 2013 dollars) in 2011-
12, my results imply that losing $1,000 in grant aid eligibility decreased late-stage 
persistence overall by approximately 4 percentage points. This estimate is consistent with 
previous studies that have examined the effect of need-based aid on initial enrollment and 
early persistence (Dynarski, 2003; Goldrick-Rab et al., 2014) and therefore suggests that 
the effect of need-based aid on enrollment is stable along the pipeline to completion. 
                                               
20
 This interpretation is substantiated by two additional facts. First, analogous results for non-EFC-eligible 
individuals, presented in Figure A1 in the Appendix, show that the distributional shift in credits observed 
among 5+ students is isolated to the EFC-eligible group. Second, I find no evidence of initial credit 
completion differences (i.e. in year t-1) among EFC-eligible students before versus after 2012. Therefore, 
the distributional shift also does not therefore appear to be an artifact of compositional changes in prior 
academic progress among treated students.   
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Because this study is based on a sudden termination of aid, it is important to note 
that the findings may not generalize to other settings where aid is gradually reduced. 
Indeed, there have been many suggestions to frontload aid to help students establish their 
footing in college (Bettinger, 2004; DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2002), and it 
remains possible that attenuating aid in moderation and with frequent reminder could 
have little consequence on postsecondary attainment. Nevertheless, because the effect on 
persistence I estimate shows no signs of fading out three years after the more stringent 
lifetime cap took effect, it remains unclear if students are capable of adapting to smaller 
award amounts without experiencing setbacks to college progress. It is also unclear if 
students would respond differently to frontloading policies according to the type of aid 
that is offered. These are important questions left for further research.  
Although my results point to a large effect on persistence, I find scant evidence 
that the threat of losing aid accelerates time to degree completion. This implies, as in 
previous work (Scott-Clayton, 2011), that grant aid is a necessary, but insufficient 
condition for accelerating academic progress. From a program design perspective, my 
results imply that leveraging financial aid to accelerate time to degree completion likely 
requires offering performance incentives tied to attainment benchmarks, although how 
large those incentives must be to realize effects and the conditions of payment are not 
well-established. Furthermore, if the financial barriers to delayed completion are of 
second order importance, aid policy may have a limited role to play in increasing on-time 
graduation. Determining the cost-effectiveness of financial aid relative to other policy 
instruments (e.g. designing more structured degree programs, changing course enrollment 
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defaults, intrusive advising, etc.) is a critical next step to addressing inefficiencies in 
degree production.    
Beyond the implications to financial aid, my results point to the large role of 
policy shocks in student decisions to withdraw from college. In rational investment 
models of schooling decisions, students are assumed to update their expectations of 
college through learning and experience and withdraw when the expected costs of 
persistence exceed the expected benefits. Yet in light of recent evidence that many 
undergraduates leave college without a degree after making substantial academic 
progress, rational investment theory may not adequately explain the enrollment decisions 
of students in many circumstances (Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009; Mabel & 
Britton, 2016; Shapiro et al., 2014). My findings suggest that unanticipated hurdles may 
induce students to dropout not by choice, but out of necessity. Indeed, the results in this 
paper are consistent with previous research on the consequences of shocks which suggest 
low-income students may be at greater risk of dropping out because they have fewer 
physic and physical resources to anticipate and absorb unforeseen obstacles when they 
arise (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013). Policy shocks may therefore play a larger role than 
is currently conceived in explaining overall levels of degree attainment and disparities by 
race and income. Understanding more broadly how shocks shape postsecondary 
trajectories and what investments buffer against them is important to resolving the gap 
between intention and attainment that characterizes the experience of many college 
students in the United States today. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Sample characteristics of college undergraduates by Pell status 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  NPSAS:12 CPS Analytic Samples 
  
All 4-Year 
College 
Undergrads 
w/ Pell  
All 4-Year 
College 
Undergrads 
w/out Pell  
Pell-EFC-
Eligible 
Non-Pell-
EFC-
Eligible 
Female 0.587 0.511 0.593 0.519 
Age 25.10 23.30 24.98 25.28 
  [0.12] [0.15] [8.00] [9.23] 
Married 0.162 0.116 0.190 0.169 
Black 0.204 0.063 0.137 0.074 
Latino 0.169 0.090 0.158 0.078 
Other race 0.110 11.6 0.104 0.084 
Family income $30,326 $102,902  $35,036 $103,000 
  [399] [994] [21,891] [36,892] 
Household size 3.20 3.70 3.79 3.69 
  [0.02] [0.02] [1.63] [1.29] 
Urban residence     0.735 0.815 
Re-enrolled in year t     0.751 0.785 
Observations 4,346,400 4,879,200 4,540 5,395 
Note: Means are shown with standard deviations in brackets. Columns (1) and (2) report statistics 
calculated with NCES PowerStats using NPSAS:12 sampling weights. Columns (3) and (4) report 
unweighted statistics. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys; 2012 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study. 
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Table 2. Sample characteristics of Pell-EFC-eligible students enrolled at a 4-year 
institution in the prior academic year by class level and years relative to the eligibility 
rule change 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) 
  2005-2011   2012-2014   
DD   2-4 Yrs 5+ Yrs   2-4 Yrs 5+ Yrs   
Female 0.590 0.620   0.590 0.570   0.050 
  [0.49] [0.48]   [0.49] [0.50]   (0.047) 
Black 0.130 0.120   0.150 0.150   -0.016 
  [0.34] [0.33]   [0.36] [0.36]   (0.033) 
Latino 0.150 0.130   0.190 0.150   0.012 
  [0.36] [0.33]   [0.39] [0.36]   (0.033) 
Other race 0.100 0.080   0.110 0.130   -0.036 
  [0.30] [0.27]   [0.32] [0.34]   (0.030) 
Age 24.70 26.08   24.75 27.68      -1.541** 
  [8.16] [7.30]   [7.75] [8.22]   (0.743) 
Married 0.190 0.210   0.180 0.240   -0.046 
  [0.39] [0.41]   [0.38] [0.43]   (0.039) 
Household size 3.830 3.430   3.860 3.560   -0.097 
  [1.61] [1.63]   [1.63] [1.81]   (0.165) 
Urban residence 0.720 0.740   0.760 0.750   0.028 
  [0.45] [0.44]   [0.42] [0.43]   (0.042) 
Observations 2617 450   1274 199     
Note: Means are shown in columns (1)-(4) with standard deviations in brackets and estimates of 
compositional differences pre- and post-treatment reported in column (5). The estimates of compositional 
differences are from separate regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the household level, are 
shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys.       
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Table 3. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Pell Grant eligibility on the 
probability of persistence (N = 4,540) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before x 5+ Yrs      0.231**     0.187**     0.211**   0.149* 
  (0.096) (0.085) (0.098) (0.086) 
5+ Yrs      -0.233*** 0.029  -0.254* 0.015 
  (0.074) (0.111) (0.151) (0.162) 
Before -0.021 -0.059 -0.020 -0.058 
  (0.033) (0.075) (0.034) (0.075) 
R
2
 0.007 0.104 0.011 0.107 
Mean of 5+ post-2012 0.603 
Controls         
Year Trends    
Demographics (D)   


D X 5+      
D X Before      
Labor Market Index (LMI)      
LMI X 5+      
State Appropriations per Student   

 
State Appropriations X 5+      
Region Fixed Effects      
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10        
Notes: Results are estimated with linear probability models. Quadratic year terms are modeled to account 
for non-linear secular trends and allowed to vary by treatment status. Individual demographics include 
indicators for gender, race, marital status, and urban residence, age in years, and household size. The labor 
market composite is an index of the seasonally adjusted state unemployment rate, employment-to-
population ratio, and regional job seekers-to-job openings ratio. All models also include a constant. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the household level, are shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Pell Grant eligibility on persistence by re-enrollment type 
(N= 4,540) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Any Four-Year Two-Year Full-Time Part-Time Public Private 
Before x 5+ Yrs   0.149* 0.140 0.008   0.158* -0.010 0.153 -0.004 
  (0.086) (0.088) (0.041) (0.090) (0.056) (0.100) (0.065) 
5+ Yrs 0.015 0.110 -0.095 0.152 -0.137 -0.093 0.108 
  (0.162) (0.170) (0.076) (0.173) (0.123) (0.183) (0.113) 
Before -0.058 -0.021 -0.037 -0.016 -0.042 -0.004 -0.055 
  (0.075) (0.081) (0.050) (0.078) (0.051) (0.083) (0.060) 
R
2
 0.107 0.098 0.029 0.156 0.039 0.061 0.042 
Mean of 5+ post-2012 0.603 0.563 0.033 0.513 0.127 0.518 0.107 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10  
Note: Results are estimated with linear probability models that include the full set of controls. See column (4) of Table 3 for details. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the household level, are shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys.           
36 
 
 
 
Table 5. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of 
Pell Grant eligibility on persistence by year following the 
reduction to lifetime eligibility (N = 4,540) 
  (1) (2) 
  
Any  
College 
4-Year 
College 
Year 1    -0.161**  -0.138* 
  (0.070) (0.072) 
Year 2 -0.041  -0.126* 
  (0.072) (0.076) 
Year 3 -0.135  -0.152* 
  (0.086) (0.086) 
P-value on F-test:  
Constant Effects in Years 1-3 
0.293 0.962 
R
2
 0.109 0.099 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10      
Notes: Results are estimated with linear probability models that include the 
full set of controls. See column (4) of Table 3 for details. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the household level, are shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Pell Grant 
eligibility on persistence using alternative sample definitions 
  (1) (2) 
  
 
Effect  
Estimate Observations 
Main estimate   0.149* 4,540 
  (0.086)   
Restricted to students not affected by    0.161* 3,597 
automatic-zero EFC rule change (0.093)   
Restricted to 2010-2014 only 0.159 2,631 
  (0.102)   
Excluding students in CA, GA, NY & OH       0.292*** 3,619 
  (0.098)   
Restricted to ages 18-35 only 0.119 4,013 
  (0.090)   
Restricted to ages 17-24 only 0.006 3,200 
  (0.099)   
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10      
Notes: Each row reports an estimate from a separate regression. All results are estimated 
with linear probability models that include the full set of controls. See column 4 of Table 3 
for details. Robust standard errors, clustered at the household level, are shown in 
parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys. 
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Table 7. Difference-in-difference-in-differences estimates of the 
effect of Pell Grant eligibility on the probability of persistence 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Model DD DD DDD 
  
Pell-EFC-
Eligible 
Pell-EFC-
Ineligible 
Pooled 
Sample 
Before x 5+ Yrs x Pell     0.161 
      (0.126) 
Before x 5+ Yrs   0.149* -0.008 -0.014 
  (0.086) (0.092) (0.092) 
5+ Yrs 0.015 -0.057 -0.051 
  (0.162) (0.165) (0.165) 
Before -0.058 0.007 -0.012 
  (0.075) (0.082) (0.058) 
Pell     0.045 
      (0.082) 
5+ x Pell     0.042 
      (0.232) 
Before x Pell     -0.048 
      (0.043) 
R
2
 0.107 0.136 0.120 
Observations 4,540 5,395 9,935 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10      
Note: Results are estimated with linear probability models and include the full set 
of controls listed in column (4) of Table 3. The model in column (3) also includes 
a full set of interactions that allow all controls to vary by treatment-by-EFC 
eligibility status. Robust standard errors, clustered at the household level, are 
shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys.   
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Table 8. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Pell Grant eligibility on the probability of bachelor's degree 
completion and the distribution of college credits completed 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Outcome 
BA 
Degree   Years of College Credits Completed 
      < 1   1   2   3   4+ 
Before x Treated -0.002   -0.018   -0.045   -0.101*   -0.012     0.177* 
  (0.103)   (0.016)   (0.033)   (0.056)   (0.020)   (0.092) 
Treated 
 -
0.351*   
     -
0.087***   
     -
0.110***   
 -
0.090*   
      
0.124***   
    
0.163** 
  (0.187)   (0.021)   (0.034)   (0.050)   (0.025)   (0.079) 
Before -0.051   -0.003   -0.003   -0.000   0.004   0.002 
  (0.074)   (0.015)   (0.013)   (0.002)   (0.018)   (0.011) 
R
2
 0.045                     
Pseudo-R
2
     0.060 
Mean of Treated in After 
Period 0.366 
  0.075   0.035   0.171   0.302   0.417 
Observations 2,182   4,540 
Control Group           
Pell-EFC-Ineligible 5+ Students                     
Pell-EFC-Eligible 2-4 Students     
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10                        
Note: Results in column (1) are estimated using a linear probability model and include 2011-12 in the post-treatment period to account for the fact that 
any incentive to accelerate time-to-degree would have emerged in the academic year before losing aid eligibility occurred. Results in columns (2) - (6) 
report marginal effects on the probability of credits completed, and are evaluated at average covariate values after running an ordered probit model.  All 
estimates are from models that include the full set of controls listed in column (4) of Table 3. Robust standard errors, clustered at the household level, 
are shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys.                 
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Figure 1. Fraction of undergraduates enrolled at a 4-year institution in the prior 
academic year returning to college by Pell EFC eligibility status, class level, 
and year 
  
 
Note: Each point reports the two-year moving average. Reference lines denote the last year 
in which EFC-eligible students enrolled in college for 7-9 years remained eligible to receive 
a Pell grant.  
Source: 2004-2014 Current Population Surveys. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of actual and placebo difference-in-differences estimates of the 
effect of Pell Grant eligibility on the probability of persistence at a four-year 
college 
   
Note: Each “effect” estimate is obtained after assigning “treatment” status to each class 
level-by-year combination in the Pell-EFC-eligible and non-EFC-eligible samples and then 
estimating a difference-in-differences model that includes the full set of controls. See column 
4 of Table 3 for model details.  
Source: 2004-2014 Current Population Surveys. 
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Figure 3. Fitted distributions of cumulative credits completed (in years) among Pell 
eligible EFC individuals enrolled at 4-year institutions in the prior academic 
year, by class level and before versus after Pell eligibility rule changes took 
effect 
 
Note: The fitted credit distributions are estimated from an ordered probit regression that 
includes the full set of controls. See column 4 of Table 3 for model details. 
Source: 2004-2014 Current Population Surveys. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Sample characteristics of non-EFC-eligible students enrolled at a 4-year 
institution in the prior academic year by class level and years relative to the eligibility 
rule change 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) 
  2005-2011   2012-2014   
DD 
  2-4 Yrs 5+ Yrs   2-4 Yrs 5+ Yrs   
Female 0.53 0.48   0.52 0.46   0.017 
  [0.50] [0.50]   [0.50] [0.50]   (0.044) 
Black 0.08 0.07   0.07 0.06   0.010 
  [0.27] [0.26]   [0.26] [0.23]   (0.022) 
Latino 0.08 0.08   0.08 0.11   -0.022 
  [0.26] [0.27]   [0.27] [0.31]   (0.027) 
Other race 0.08 0.08   0.08 0.13   -0.045 
  [0.28] [0.28]   [0.27] [0.33]   (0.028) 
Age 24.73 29.30   24.73 27.56       1.746** 
  [8.90] [10.36]   [9.17] [9.06]   (0.832) 
Married 0.16 0.30   0.14 0.16        0.124*** 
  [0.37] [0.46]   [0.35] [0.37]   (0.035) 
Household size 3.72 3.44   3.74 3.51   -0.048 
  [1.29] [1.30]   [1.23] [1.38]   (0.117) 
Urban residence 0.80 0.82   0.84 0.86   -0.006 
  [0.40] [0.38]   [0.37] [0.34]   (0.032) 
Observations 3438 523   1228 206     
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10  
Note: Means are shown in columns (1)-(4) with standard deviations in brackets and estimates of 
compositional differences pre- and post-treatment reported in column (5). The estimates of compositional 
differences are from separate regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the household level, are 
shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys. 
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Table A2. Sample characteristics of bachelor's degree attainment sample by Pell EFC 
eligibility status and years relative to eligibility rule change 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) 
  2004-2010   2011-2013   
DD   
Pell-
EFC-
Eligible 
Non-
EFC-
Eligible   
Pell-
EFC-
Eligible 
Non-
EFC-
Eligible   
Female 0.61 0.54   0.55 0.51   0.029 
  [0.49] [0.50]   [0.50] [0.50]   (0.045) 
Black 0.12 0.07   0.12 0.05   -0.005 
  [0.33] [0.25]   [0.32] [0.23]   (0.027) 
Latino 0.10 0.07   0.16 0.08   -0.046 
  [0.30] [0.25]   [0.36] [0.27]   (0.029) 
Other race 0.08 0.08   0.13 0.11   -0.027 
  [0.27] [0.27]   [0.34] [0.31]   (0.029) 
Age 25.35 28.09   26.71 26.76       -2.686*** 
  [7.18] [10.26]   [8.54] [9.36]   (0.814) 
Married 0.20 0.28   0.24 0.17       -0.147*** 
  [0.40] [0.45]   [0.43] [0.38]   (0.038) 
Household size 3.39 3.50   3.62 3.51   -0.214 
  [1.67] [1.39]   [1.77] [1.33]   (0.148) 
Urban residence 0.74 0.83   0.77 0.87   0.020 
  [0.44] [0.38]   [0.42] [0.33]   (0.038) 
Observations 635 811   350 386     
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10  
Note: The sample includes individuals who earned a bachelor's degree in year t-1 and is limited to 5+ 
students. Means are shown in columns (1)-(4) with standard deviations in brackets and estimates of 
compositional differences pre- and post-treatment reported in column (5). The estimates of compositional 
differences are from separate regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the household level, are 
shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys. 
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Table A3. Nonparametric year-over-year difference-in-differences 
estimates of the "effect" of Pell Grant eligibility on persistence  
(N = 4,540) 
  (1) (2) 
Pre eligibility rule change     
2006 - 2005 0.046 0.027 
  (0.089) (0.084) 
2007 - 2006 -0.081 -0.118 
  (0.103) (0.096) 
2008 - 2007 -0.111 -0.117 
  (0.104) (0.100) 
2009 - 2008 0.105 0.032 
  (0.092) (0.104) 
2010 - 2009 0.119 0.129 
  (0.084) (0.084) 
2011 - 2010 -0.002 0.020 
  (0.070) (0.066) 
Post eligibility rule change     
2012 - 2011      -0.224***  -0.140* 
  (0.081) (0.072) 
2013 - 2012 0.146 0.121 
  (0.090) (0.079) 
2014 - 2013 -0.127 -0.089 
  (0.096) (0.090) 
R
2
 0.754 0.779 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10      
Notes: Results are estimated with linear probability models. Column (1) includes 
year and year-by-5+ fixed effects. Column (2) also includes the full set of 
demographic and economic controls. See column (4) of Table 3 for details. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the household level, are shown in parentheses. 
Source: 2004-2014 October Current Population Surveys. 
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Figure A1. Fitted distributions of cumulative credits completed (in years) among non-
EFC eligible individuals enrolled at 4-year institutions in the prior academic 
year, by class level and before versus after Pell eligibility rule changes took 
effect
Note: The fitted credit distributions are estimated from an ordered probit regression that 
includes the full set of controls. See column 4 of Table 3 for model details. 
Source: 2004-2014 Current Population Surveys 
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